Chip Auth Proof
Cryptographic proof from BSI TR-03110 Chip Authentication, carried inside a CeiIdentityClaim.
CA proves the physical chip holds the private key corresponding to the public key in DG14, which is hashed in the SOD by MAI. This binds the identity data (DG1) and the CE81 active authentication key to the same physical card via a single MAI-signed document (EF.SOD).
In server-key mode (serverMode = true), terminalPublicKey was supplied by the server and the corresponding private key never left the server. The server verifies sharedSecretX by independently computing ECDH(d_terminal_server, Q_chip) — a compromised app cannot forge this because it never had d_terminal.
In local mode (serverMode = false), the keypair was generated on-device (v1 flow).
Properties
True when terminalPublicKey was supplied by the server (v2 flow — d_terminal never on device)
X coordinate of the ECDH shared secret K_ca (32 bytes)
Terminal EC public key sent to chip via GENERAL AUTHENTICATE (uncompressed, 65 bytes, brainpoolP256r1)